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Abstract
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on
the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion
and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empiri-
cal puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can
be explained. Increasing risk leads to a less informative performance
signal. Under limited liability, the principal may optimally react by in-
creasing the weight on the signal and, hence, choosing higher-powered
incentives.
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1 Introduction
In the well-known principal-agent model with a risk neutral principal and
a risk averse agent we face the typical negative relationship between exoge-
nous risk and incentives: if risk is large and, hence, the risk premium (or
risk costs) from high-powered incentives would be high the principal will op-
timally choose low incentives for the agent. Contrary, if risk is small so that
risk costs from induced incentives are rather low, the principal will prefer
high-powered incentives.
Prendergast (2002) refers to several empirical studies which point to a
positive relation between risk and incentives and therefore challenge the tra-
ditional view. Consequently, he offers alternative explanations for this em-
pirical puzzle. In his modeling, he assumes that the agent is risk neutral
in order to abstract from the classical trade-off. This assumption may be
crucial. For example, if in Prendergast (2002) the agent were risk averse and
high risk makes the principal prefer output-based to input-based contracts,
the well-known traditional trade-off would apply again. Another explanation
for the empirical puzzle is introduced by Raith (2003). There, the positive
relationship between risk and incentives comes as a by-product. Raith as-
sumes that agents are risk averse so that incentives indeed imply risk costs.
However, since agents face a binding participation constraint and principals
always realize zero profits due to market competition, neither the agent nor
the principal (but society) has to bear the risk costs from inducing incentives.
Hence, less extreme competition may lead to different findings concerning the
trade-off. Finally, Wright (2004) and Serfes (2005) independently develop a
matching approach that can explain the puzzle. If competition makes less
risk averse agents match with more risky principals, the outcome may be a
positive relation between risks and incentives.
In this note, we offer an alternative explanation for the empirical puz-
zle which does neither need risk neutral agents nor market competition as
a driving force. We only combine two standard contracting problems – risk
aversion and limited liability – which should be present in many circum-
stances so that this approach seems to be the most natural explanation for
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a positive relationship between risk and incentives. In our model, the agent
earns a non-negative rent. If risk increases and, hence, the performance signal
becomes less informative, it can pay for the principal to increase the weight
on this signal by choosing higher-powered incentives. Since the agent’s indi-
vidual rationality constraint is non-binding at the optimum, the principal’s
additional incentive costs will not increase too steeply: they only increase in
terms of expected wage payments whereas the progressively increasing effort
costs simply reduce the agent’s rent.
Our note is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model.
Section 3 analyzes the possibility of a positive risk-incentive relationship
under the optimal contract. Sections 4 contains an illustrating example.
Section 5 will conclude.
2 The Model
We consider a typical moral-hazard problem between a risk averse agent and
a risk neutral principal based on the binary-signal model used by Demougin
and Garvie (1991) and Demougin and Fluet (2001), for example. The agent
chooses a non-negative effort a that is unobservable to the principal. The non-
contractible value of this effort to the principal is described by the function
v (a) with v′ (a) > 0 and v′′ (a) < 0. In choosing a, the agent incurs a private
cost c(a), which, together with his utility u(w) from wealth w, describes his
preferences by the utility function U(w, a) = u(w) − c(a). We assume that
u (0) = 0, u′ > 0, u′′ ≤ 0, and c (a)′ > 0, c (a)′′ > 0,∀a > 0. To ensure an
interior solution we assume c (0) = 0, c′ (0) = 0 and lima→∞c
′ (a) = ∞. The
agent’s reservation utility is given by U¯ = 0.
Principal and agent observe a contractible signal s ∈
{
sL, sH
}
on the
agent’s performance with sH > sL. The outcome s = sH is favorable in-
formation about the agent’s effort choice in the sense of Milgrom (1981).
Let the probability of this favorable outcome be p(a) with p′ (a) > 0 (strict
monotone likelihood ratio property) and p′′ (a) < 0 (convexity of the dis-
tribution function condition). Since the signal s is the only observable and
verifiable information on the agent’s performance, the principal offers a pay-
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ment scheme w (s) with w
(
sL
)
= wL and w
(
sH
)
= wH . We assume that
the agent is protected by limited liability in the sense of wL, wH ≥ 0.
To make the analysis of the risk-incentive trade-off more precise, we first
provide definitions of more risky (less informative) outcomes and higher-
powered or stronger incentives. To that purpose, we compare different binary
signals s, sˆ ∈ {sL, sH} with probabilities p(a) and pˆ(a) for the favorable
outcome sH . Thus, the support of the outcome distribution does not change,
but probabilities do. We define a performance signal sˆ to be more risky
(less informative with respect to the agent’s action) than a signal s, if sˆ is a
garbling from s, i.e. if there exists a number b ∈ (0, 1/2] such that
pˆ(a) = (1− b) · p(a) + b · (1− p(a)) = b+ (1− 2b)p(a).
This is a special case of Blackwell informativeness, where the garbling is
symmetric among realizations.1 We will use this garbling in the following.
b ∈ (0, 1/2] is without loss of generality. It only makes sure that the favorable
outcome in s is also the favorable one in sˆ. Garbling can easily be interpreted
in terms of risk in the binary model since the variance of signal s is p(a)(1−
p(a))(sH−sL)2, which is maximized for p(a) = 1/2. Obviously, (1−b) ·p(a)+
b · (1− p(a)) is closer to 1/2 than p(a) for all p(a) ∈ [0, 1] and b ∈ (0, 1/2].
Finally, we specify the meaning of higher-powered incentives and a posi-
tive risk-incentive relationship. The payment scheme
wˆ =
{
wˆH if sˆ = s
H
wˆL if sˆ = s
L
based on the signal sˆ is higher-powered than the scheme
w =
{
wH if s = s
H
wL if s = s
L
based on s if wˆH − wˆL > wH −wL. We will speak of a positive risk-incentive
1Note that our findings will qualitatively hold for asymmetric garbling. Extending the
analysis to asymmetric garbling can only increase the set of possible cases for which a
positive risk-incentive relation holds.
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relationship if
∂ (wˆH − wˆL)
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=0
> 0,
that is if marginal garbling yields higher-powered incentives.
3 Risk and Incentives
In setting wL and wH , the principal’s aim is to maximize his profit net of
expected wage payments, provided the agent accepts the contract and chooses
the desired action, and the wages fulfill the limited-liability constraint:
max
wL,wH ,a
v(a)− p(a)wH − (1− p(a))wL
subject to p(a)u(wH) + (1− p(a))u(wL)− c(a) ≥ 0, (IR)
a ∈ argmax
α
{p(α)u(wH) + (1− p(α))u(wL)− c(α)} , (IC)
wH , wL ≥ 0. (LL)
Since both the monotone likelihood ratio property and the convexity of
the distribution function condition hold, the incentive compatibility con-
straint can be replaced by the first-order condition
p′(a) (u(wH)− u(wL)) = c
′(a).
In the optimal solution, the individual rationality constraint (IC) will
be non-binding and the limited-liability condition (LL) will be binding for
wL. To see this, note that the agent can always obtain a non-negative ex-
pected utility by accepting the contract and choosing zero effort. Hence, the
agent will always earn a non-negative rent. Since wL decreases incentives
but increases labor costs, the principal will optimally choose w∗L = 0. The
optimization problem then reduces to
max
wH ,a
pi (wH) = v(a)− p(a)wH
subject to p′(a)u(wH) = c
′(a).
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Now we introduce our symmetric garbling from Section 2 by replacing p(a)
with pˆ (a) = (1− b)p(a)+ b(1− p(a)) (b ∈ (0, 1/2]) so that the corresponding
optimization problem can be written as
max
wH ,a
pi (wH) = v(a)− [b+ (1− 2b) p(a)]wH
subject to (1− 2b) p′(a)u(wH) = c
′(a). (IC’)
The incentive constraint (IC’) shows that a more risky performance signal
requires higher-powered incentives for implementing the same effort level a.
Proposition 1 To implement a given action a at minimal cost, higher-
powered incentives are necessary under a more risky performance measure.
Proof. Obvious from (IC’).
The intuition is straightforward: if the outcome becomes more risky and,
hence, the performance signal is less informative about the agent’s effort
choice, incentives will decline. To restore former incentives, the principal has
to choose a higher weight for the performance signal, i.e. a higher value of
wH .
2 However, it is not clear whether the principal should optimally react
to increased risk by increasing incentives as well: a higher value of wH also
increases the principal’s labor cost in case of a favorable performance signal
and, therefore, the agent’s rent. The principal is therefore likely to reduce the
implemented action in order to reduce the required wage payment. Which
of the two countervailing effects dominates is not clear from the outset.
In case of a finite action space A = {a1, . . . , an}, it is easy to construct
situations in which a higher wage spread will result: if under s the principal is
not indifferent between the implemented action and another, an incremental
increase in risk will not result in a change of the desired action, and a positive
risk-incentive relationship will apply:
Corollary 2 If the principal strictly prefers the implemented action in a
model with a finite action space, there is a positive risk-incentive relationship.
2Note that this general finding on increased risk and higher powered incentives also
holds under unlimited liability.
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Proof. Let A be ordered such that c(aj) > c(aj−1) for j = 2, . . . , n. If both
the monotone likelihood ratio (MLRP) and the convexity of the distribution
function condition (CDFC) as defined by Grossman and Hart (1983) hold,3
the incentive constraint (IC) can be written as
(1− 2b) [p(aj)− p(aj−1)]u(wH) ≥ c(aj)− c(aj−1), (IC”)
which is fulfilled with equality in the second-best contract. Let as be the
optimal action to be implemented by performance measure s, with a net
profit of Πs accruing to the principal. Moreover, let Π−s < Πs denote the
maximum net profit under the actions a ∈ A\as. Now consider a garbling of
s. From (IC”), the cost of inducing as is
Wˆ (as, b) = pˆ(as)u
−1
(
c(as)− c(as−1)
pˆ(as)− pˆ(as−1)
)
= [b+ (1− 2b)p(as)]u
−1
(
c(as)− c(as−1)
(1− 2b)(p(as)− p(as−1))
)
.
This function is continuous in b and identical to the cost of inducing as
without garbling for b = 0. Therefore, there exists a critical value bˆ up
to which Πˆs = v(as) −W (as, b) is greater than Π−s. For such values of b,
action as will still be optimal under the garbled performance measure. The
positive risk-incentive relationship then follows from proposition 1 and (IC”),
respectively.
In case of a continuous action, let a∗ = a∗ (wH) be the agent’s incentive
compatible effort choice implicitly described by (IC’) with
∂a∗
∂wH
= −
(1− 2b) p′(a∗)u′(wH)
(1− 2b) p′′(a∗)u(wH)− c′′(a∗)
> 0 (1)
and
∂a∗
∂b
=
2p′(a∗)u(wH)
(1− 2b) p′′(a∗)u(wH)− c′′(a∗)
< 0 (2)
so that the first-order condition to the principal’s optimization problem can
3MLRP here is simply p(aj) ≥ p(aj−1) for j = 2, . . . , n, CDFC means that if c(aj) =
λc(ai) + (1− λ)c(ak) for some λ ∈ [0, 1], then p(aj) ≥ λp(ai) + (1− λ)p(ak).
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be written as
dpi (wH , a
∗ (wH))
dwH
= v′(a∗)
∂a∗
∂wH
− [b+ (1− 2b) p(a∗)] (3)
−
(
(1− 2b) p′(a∗)
∂a∗
∂wH
)
wH = 0.
Suppose that the principal’s problem is well-behaved, that is the second-order
condition
d2pi (wH , a
∗ (wH))
dw2H
= (v′′(a∗)− (1− 2b) p′′(a∗)wH)
(
∂a∗
∂wH
)2
+ (v′(a∗)− (1− 2b) p′(a∗)wH)
∂2a∗
∂w2H
− 2 (1− 2b) p′(a∗)
∂a∗
∂wH
< 0
is satisfied.4
Now we can analyze the possibility of a positive risk-incentive relation-
ship. Implicit differentiation of (3) yields
∂wH
∂b
= −
d2pi (wH , a
∗ (wH)) /dwHdb
d2pi (wH , a∗ (wH)) /dw2H
so that
sign
(
∂wH
∂b
)
= sign
(
d2pi (wH , a
∗ (wH))
dwHdb
)
.
The sign of this derivative depends on whether the marginal returns or
the marginal costs from increasing incentives react stronger to increased risk.
4Note that without further specifying the underlying functions, the sign of
d2pi(wH ,a
∗(wH))
dw2
H
is unclear. For example, the expression ∂
2a∗
∂w2
H
depends on the third deriva-
tives of the functions p (a) and c (a).
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We obtain
d2pi (wH , a
∗ (wH))
dwHdb
= v′′(a∗)
∂a∗
∂b
∂a∗
∂wH︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+ (v′(a∗)− (1− 2b) p′(a∗)wH)
∂2a∗
∂wH∂b︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
−
[
(1− 2p(a∗)) + (1− 2b) p′(a∗)
∂a∗
∂b
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
+ 2p′(a∗)
∂a∗
∂wH
wH︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
− (1− 2b) p′′(a∗)wH
∂a∗
∂b
∂a∗
∂wH︸ ︷︷ ︸
E
.
Altogether, there are five effects that determine the possibility of a positive
risk-incentive relationship. Since v (a) is concave, reducing a by increased
risk (i.e. ∂a
∗
∂b
) is favorable for creating incentives since now incentives are
induced at a higher productivity level. Hence, expression A is positive.
The sign of expression B is not clear. We know that the marginal net
profits from increased effort are positive since the first-order condition (3)
can be rewritten as
(v′(a∗)− (1− 2b) p′(a∗)wH) =
[b+ (1− 2b) p(a∗)]
∂a∗
∂wH
.
However, the mixed derivative ∂
2a∗
∂wH∂b
may be either positive or negative. It
measures how marginal incentives ∂a
∗
∂wH
react to increased risk. On the one
hand, the agent may be discouraged if the performance signal becomes less
informative. On the other hand, marginal incentives become more effective
since productivity (in terms of the probability function p (·)) increases with
decreased a due to concavity.
Expression C describes whether the probability of the wage payment wH
is reduced or enhanced by increased risk. First, garbling makes the original
probability p(a∗) tend to 1/2. Depending on whether initially p(a∗) was
smaller or larger than 1/2, garbling increases or decreases the probability
of the high wage payment. Second, increased risk reduces optimal effort a∗
which is favorable to the principal in the sense of a decreased expected wage
payment.
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Expression C directly corresponds to the reaction of the agent’s rent to
increased incentives and risk. The rent is defined as
R(wH) = [b+ (1− 2b)p(a
∗)]u(wH)− c(a
∗)
with a∗ depending on wH and b according to equations (1) and (2). Applying
the envelope theorem yields
dR
dwH
=
∂R
∂wH
= [b+ (1− 2b)p(a∗)]u′(wH) > 0.
Hence, increasing incentives for a given risk will increase the agent’s rent.
The derivative with respect to b,[
(1− 2p(a∗)) + (1− 2b) p′(a∗)
∂a∗
∂b
]
u′(wH),
shows that if expression C is positive, then the increase of the rent due to
higher-powered incentives will decrease in risk, what will favor a positive
risk-incentive relationship.
According to expression D, garbling directly reduces marginal expected
costs for creating incentives.
Finally, expression E can be interpreted analogously to A. Since p (a) is
also strictly concave, a reduction of a via increased risk (i.e. ∂a
∗
∂b
) leads to a
higher productivity in terms of probability. If now incentives are increased,
additional expected wage costs will be rather large.
To sum up, a higher risk has favorable effects on increasing incentives
which may become more effective and less costly. If these positive effects
dominate the negative ones in form of a higher wage payment wH and a less
informative performance signal, there will be a positive relationship between
risk and incentives under limited liability. Note that the agent’s limited
liability is crucial for our findings as it makes creating incentives relatively
cheap for the principal: the individual rationality constraint is non-binding
at the optimum. Hence, increasing incentives via wH only increases the
principal’s incentive costs in terms of expected money payment. However,
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the principal does not have to care about the steeply increasing effort costs
c (a), which only decrease the agent’s rent.
Applying our definition from Section 2 (with b = 0) leads to the following
result:
Proposition 3 Let
d2pi(wH ,a
∗(wH))
dw2
H
< 0. If
(v′′(a∗)− p′′(a∗)wH)
∂a∗
∂wH
∂a∗
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=0
+ (v′(a∗)− p′(a∗)wH)
∂2a∗
∂wH∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=0
− (1− 2p(a∗)) +
(
2
∂a∗
∂wH
wH −
∂a∗
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=0
)
p′(a∗) > 0,
the optimal contract will exhibit a positive risk-incentive relationship.
4 An Example
In this section, we illustrate that a positive risk-incentive relationship can
easily be constructed with standard concave and convex polynomial func-
tions. Let p (a) = a
1
2 , v (a) = 2a
1
2 , u (wH) = 2 (wH)
1
2 , and c (a) = 1
2
a2.
The incentive constraint for this parameterized version of the model is
given by
(1− 2b)
1
3 (wH)
1
6 = a
1
2 .
Inserting into the principal’s objective function v(a)− [b+ (1− 2b) p(a)]wH
then leads to expected net profits
pi (wH) = 2 (1− 2b)
1
3 (wH)
1
6 −
(
b+ (1− 2b)
4
3 (wH)
1
6
)
wH .
The first-order condition yields
pi′ (wH) = −
(
b+
(7wH (1− 2b)− 2) (1− 2b)
1
3
6w
5
6
H
)
= 0,
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and the second-order condition
−
1
36w
11
6
H
(
(7wH (1− 2b) + 10) (1− 2b)
1
3
)
< 0,
which is always satisfied. Using b = 0 in the first-order condition gives the
optimal wage
wH =
2
7
.
Finally, we will have a positive risk-incentive relationship if
∂pi′ (wH)
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=0,wH=
2
7
> 0.
We obtain
∂pi′ (wH)
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=0,wH=
2
7
= −1−
(4− 56wH (1− 2b)) (1− 2b)
1
3
18w
5
6
H (1− 2b)
∣∣∣∣∣
b=0,wH=
2
7
= 0.89365 > 0.
Note that (at b = 0) we have p (a∗) = (a∗)
1
2 = (wH)
1
6 = 0.81156 < 1.
5 Conclusion
Given a risk averse agent, providing incentives is costly for the principal since
incentive-compatible payment leads to a positive risk premium which usually
increases in the magnitude of the exogenous risk. For this reason, the stan-
dard principal-agent hidden-action model claims a negative relationship be-
tween risk and optimal incentives. Several empirical findings have challenged
this traditional view. By combining risk aversion with limited liability – the
two standard contracting problems given a verifiable performance signal –
we obtain an explanation for a positive risk-incentive relationship without
relying on additional assumptions from outside the textbook model.
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